Carl von Clausewitz’s book On War

Carl von Clausewitz’s book On War is a seminal text for those who study war. According to historian John Keegan Clausewitz was a “keen observer of the present and a devotee of the future who failed to see how deeply rooted he was in his own past, the past of the professional officer class of a centralized European state.[1] Nevertheless, as William Olson, in his article, “The Continuing Irrelevance of Clausewitz” in Small Wars Journal notes “his [Clausewitz’s] real relevance does not lie in how he can be used, operationalized, codified, mummified but in his insistence that what was involved in his own time and vital for all who follow was the need to grasp the significance of war as a very human phenomenon requiring serious, constant attention to understand.”[2] Clausewitz viewed war as a rational instrument of national policy. In essence, he argued that the decision to wage war “ought” to be rational; “ought” to be instrumental/goal oriented; and it “ought” to advance the interest of the national state (an expression of culture etcetera). Using the assigned readings from On War, For the Common Defense, and various provided articles; videos; and in-class discussions examine EITHER the American Revolution OR the War of 1812 and determine if Clausewitz’s standard definition of war as “the continuation of political intercourse with the intermixing of other means” holds true.