On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussain invaded Kuwait. The US response was swift and effective. On January 16, 1991, the U.S. and other U.N. members began daily bombing raids, and on February 23, 1991, the ground assault began. Within one hundred hours Kuwait was liberated and the first President Bush declared a cease-fire.
In his State of the Union address in January 2002, the second President Bush stated that we must "prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction." On the night of March 19, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom began, and by mid-April Saddam's statues were toppling. Swift and short, on May 1, 2003, standing before a huge banner declaring "Mission Accomplished" aboard an aircraft carrier, President Bush declared victory in the Iraq War. Was this declaration premature?
Review the following sections of the following chapters: Chapter 23: "Origins of the Cold War," Chapter 25: "Vietnam and the New Left," Chapter 26: "Foreign Policy and Watergate" and Chapter 27: "The Post-Cold War World."
Read the following article
Utilize at least one of the linked sources provided in this assignment to support your discussion.
Identify and incorporate at least one additional outside source to support your discussion. In addition to the textbook, you may use any material outside of the textbook that is recommended in the Additional Reading section at the end of each chapter. You are also encouraged to do your own research and identify relevant sources. Please keep in mind that WIKIPEDIA is not an acceptable reference.
Write a well-organized essay, a minimum of 700 words (but not limited to), including supporting details from the documents/textbook/other sources in which you analyze and discuss the material that has been assigned by addressing the following question:
Compare the Gulf War with one of the following wars: the Korean War, Vietnam, or the Iraq War, identifying and discussing similarities and differences that may explain why the US "won" the Gulf War, but did not "win" the other. In your opinion, are these valid comparisons?
Full Answer Section
One striking similarity between the Gulf War and the Iraq War lies in the stated justification for military intervention. In both instances, the United States framed its actions as a response to aggression and a defense of international norms. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was a clear violation of international sovereignty, condemned by the United Nations Security Council. President H.W. Bush articulated the need to restore Kuwait’s independence and uphold the principle that aggression would not be tolerated ( Brands, 2016). Similarly, President G.W. Bush’s administration argued that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was necessary to disarm Saddam Hussein of alleged weapons of mass destruction and to prevent him from supporting terrorism, echoing the earlier concern about regimes sponsoring terror articulated in his 2002 State of the Union address. As Chapter 27 of our textbook notes, the post-Cold War era saw the US increasingly willing to intervene in the name of humanitarianism and the prevention of rogue states from threatening global security. However, the evidence for Iraq’s WMD program proved to be flawed, a critical difference that would significantly impact the legitimacy and long-term consequences of the Iraq War compared to the clear-cut aggression in Kuwait.
Despite the initial framing around international norms and security, the objectives and scope of the two wars differed significantly. The Gulf War had a clearly defined and limited objective: the liberation of Kuwait. Once this goal was achieved, the U.S. and its coalition partners largely ceased major military operations within Iraq itself, respecting the U.N. mandate. As Chapter 27 discusses, the end of the Cold War allowed for a greater degree of international consensus and U.N. action, which legitimized the intervention in Kuwait. The Iraq War, however, had a far broader and more ambitious agenda: regime change, the dismantling of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, and the establishment of a democratic Iraq. This expansive goal, lacking the same level of international consensus and a clear exit strategy, proved to be a crucial difference. As Brands (2016) argues, the “mission creep” in Iraq, moving beyond disarmament to nation-building, entangled the U.S. in a prolonged and complex insurgency. This contrasts sharply with the focused and relatively short military campaign in Kuwait.
The nature of the opposition and the internal political landscape in both countries also played a significant role in the outcomes. In Kuwait, the U.S.-led coalition faced a conventional military force that, while initially successful in the invasion, was ultimately outmatched by the superior technology and coordinated strategy of the coalition. The Kuwaiti population largely supported the liberation effort. In Iraq, while the initial invasion faced relatively swift military collapse of Saddam’s conventional forces, the subsequent occupation encountered a deeply fractured society, a simmering insurgency fueled by sectarian divisions, and the absence of a unified, stable post-Saddam political structure. As Chapter 27 highlights, the complexities of post-Cold War interventions often involved navigating intricate internal political dynamics, a challenge far more pronounced in Iraq than in the clear case of an external invasion of Kuwait. The lack of a cohesive and widely accepted opposition to Saddam before the invasion, unlike the exiled Kuwaiti government, further complicated the post-war stabilization efforts.
The international coalition and the degree of multilateral support were also key differentiating factors. The Gulf War enjoyed broad international legitimacy through the backing of numerous U.N. resolutions and a diverse coalition of nations contributing military forces. This international consensus provided political and logistical support, enhancing the perceived legitimacy and the efficiency of the operation. As our textbook notes, the end of the Cold War created a unique window for such multilateral action. The Iraq War, however, was far more divisive internationally. While the U.S. assembled a “coalition of the willing,” it lacked the same level of broad U.N. support, which arguably undermined its international legitimacy and long-term sustainability. Many allies expressed skepticism about the intelligence regarding WMDs and the wisdom of regime change, leading to a less unified and more strained international effort.
In my opinion, comparing the Gulf War to the Iraq War to explain the divergent outcomes is largely valid, although it requires careful nuance. The stark differences in objectives, the nature of the opposition, and the degree of international support provide compelling explanations for why the U.S. achieved its limited goals relatively quickly in Kuwait but became bogged down in a protracted and ultimately less successful conflict in Iraq. The clearer violation of international law by Saddam in 1990, compared to the contested justifications for the 2003 invasion, also played a significant role in shaping international and domestic support.
However, the comparison is not without its limitations. The post-war phases of both conflicts, while drastically different in scale and duration, both presented significant challenges. Even after the liberation of Kuwait, the region remained unstable, and the question of how to deal with Saddam Hussein’s continued rule persisted, eventually contributing to the later decision to invade Iraq. Furthermore, the definition of “winning” is subjective and can evolve over time. While the U.S. achieved its immediate military objective in Kuwait, the long-term consequences for regional stability and the rise of extremist groups are still debated. Similarly, while the initial military phase in Iraq was swift, the subsequent years of insurgency and state-building failures raise serious questions about the overall success of the endeavor.
In conclusion, comparing the Gulf War with the Iraq War highlights crucial lessons about the importance of clearly defined objectives, robust international support, a thorough understanding of the internal political landscape, and the potential pitfalls of expansive and poorly planned interventions. While the swift military victory in Kuwait contrasts sharply with the protracted conflict in Iraq, attributing this solely to the nature of the wars themselves requires acknowledging the complex interplay of political, military, and international factors that shaped their respective trajectories. The “Mission Accomplished” banner, prematurely celebrating victory in Iraq, serves as a stark reminder of the complexities of modern warfare and the often-vast gulf between initial military success and lasting strategic outcomes.