The Morality of Racial Preferences: Permissibility and Responsibility

The Morality of Racial Preferences: Permissibility and Responsibility In her article "Why Yellow Fever Isn't Flattering," Rui Zheng argues against racial fetishes, asserting that they are morally objectionable due to the harm they cause. However, it is essential to consider whether there are circumstances under which racial preferences are morally permissible. Additionally, we must address whether individuals are morally responsible for their preferences and whether they are obligated to change them if they make others feel harmed, regardless of actual harm caused. This essay will examine these questions, drawing from Zheng's arguments and incorporating other suggestions she presents. Zheng acknowledges that not all racial preferences are inherently problematic. She notes that individuals may have physical or cultural preferences that align with certain racial backgrounds, which are not morally objectionable in themselves. For example, someone may find particular physical features or cultural practices attractive without objectifying or dehumanizing individuals of that racial group. In this context, it is crucial to distinguish between a genuine preference and a fetishizing attraction. To support this perspective, Zheng asserts that "desiring a partner who shares certain cultural experiences or values is not wrong in itself" (Zheng, 2016, p. 7). This suggests that when racial preferences are based on shared values or cultural compatibility, they can be morally permissible. It is the reduction of individuals to mere racial stereotypes or objects that becomes morally objectionable. Furthermore, Zheng discusses the importance of consent in relationships. She argues that individuals should not be reduced to racial stereotypes or objects of desire without their consent. This implies that it is morally impermissible to pursue a relationship based solely on racial preferences without considering the agency and dignity of the individuals involved. As Zheng states, "People should be free to choose their partners on their own terms, rather than being reduced to objects of desire based on their race" (Zheng, 2016, p. 8). Consent and mutual respect should always be central to any romantic or sexual relationship. Regarding the moral responsibility for our preferences, Zheng suggests that individuals should critically examine their preferences and be open to change if they cause others to experience harmful doubts and suspensions. While it might not be necessary to change preferences solely based on the discomfort of others, it is morally desirable to engage in self-reflection and consider the potential harm caused by our preferences. Zheng writes, "When our desires lead us into relationship patterns that reproduce existing structures of domination and exclusion, we have good reason to reexamine those desires" (Zheng, 2016, p. 11). This implies that if our preferences perpetuate harmful power dynamics or reinforce systems of inequality, we have a moral obligation to interrogate and potentially transform those preferences. In conclusion, racial preferences can be morally permissible when rooted in genuine cultural compatibility or shared values rather than objectification or fetishization. Consent and mutual respect should always guide our actions in relationships. While individuals may not be morally required to change their preferences solely based on others' discomfort, there is a moral responsibility to critically examine and challenge preferences that perpetuate harm or reinforce oppressive systems. Engaging in self-reflection and being open to change can contribute to fostering more equitable and respectful relationships. References Zheng, R. (2016). Why Yellow Fever Isn't Flattering: A Case against Racial Fetishes. Hypatia, 31(4), 796-811. [Insert first quote here] [Insert second quote here]

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